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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a July 3, 2003 Order and Decree Quieting Title of Judge 
Tyrone E. Medley of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Appeals from final decisions can be made as a matter of right to the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. The Notice of Appeal was filed with 
the Utah Supreme Court on July 31, 2003. On September 15, 2003, and pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion 
to transfer this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue for Review: Whether the trial court properly gave effect to the intent and 
purpose of the previous Decree of Divorce in holding that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in 
the prior marital home of the parties. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this issue is that the trial court's 
interpretation of a contract be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but 
that they are reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 WL 2251963 5 
(Utah) (November 7, 2003); Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 778-79 (Utah 1992); Wade v. 
Stangl 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). 
RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in Lower Court 
In a 1990 divorce, Plaintiff Allen's former spouse was awarded the family marital 
residence located in Sandy, Utah (the "Sandy Property"). The Decree of Divorce (the 
"Decree"), later recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder, awarded Sarah Satterfield 
Allen ("Sarah") such property "as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by the 
plaintiff...", but with a contingent right of reversion in favor of Plaintiff Allen in the event 
Sarah moved from Salt Lake City at any time before their youngest child reached the age of 
18. 
Sarah subsequently mortgaged the Sandy Property on several occasions and ultimately 
sold the Sandy Property in January 1999 to Defendant Thomas K. Hall. Thereafter, Sarah 
resided in another home within the Salt Lake City area. 
Before the youngest child reached the age of 18, Sarah moved out of state. 
Plaintiff Allen seeks strict enforcement of the contingent reversionary interest in the 
Sandy Property based upon the Decree provision intended to give him one-half the home's 
equity in the event Sarah should move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff Allen alleges that he owns the Sandy Property free and clear of any mortgages or 
interests of Defendants. 
Plaintiff Allen filed this action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on May 18, 2000. 
On May 20,2003, trial in this matter was held before the lower court, the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley presiding. 
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Following the trial, Judge Medley issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on June 109 2003. Judge Medley found that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy 
Property due to the facts presented at trial. A copy of such Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law is attached as Addendum "A". 
On July 3, 2003, Judge Medley entered his Order and Decree Quieting Title, ruling 
that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy Property and that Defendant Hall owned the 
same subject to the lien of Defendant Homecomings. A copy of such Order and Decree 
Quieting Title is attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
Plaintiff Allen filed a Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2003. 
Statement of Facts 
The facts of this case are virtually undisputed. However, the following facts are 
relevant to the case before this Court: 
1. Plaintiff Allen and Sarah were divorced on May 17, 1990, pursuant to the 
Decree entered in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Plaintiff Allen was the plaintiff in such case. [R. at 7, 530.] 
2. The written Decree was prepared by Plaintiff Allen's attorney. [R. at 7,531 -2 
pp. 33.] 
3. Pursuant to the Decree, Sarah was awarded the Sandy Property located at 
10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, "as her sole and separate property subject to no claim 
by the plaintiff [David J. Allen]...." [R. at 9.] A copy of the Decree of Divorce is attached 
as Addendum "C" hereto. 
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4. The Decree further provided in paragraph 10: 
The defendant [Sarah] shall be responsible for all indebtedness and expenses 
therefrom, holding the plaintiff [David J. Allen] harmless therefrom. The 
plaintiff shall provide the defendant with a Quit-Claim Deed within 30 days 
of the divorce becoming final, with said Quit-Claim Deed to contain the 
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant maintaining current house 
payments and not moving from the Salt lake City area before the last child 
reaches age 18. If the defendant shall become more than 60 days in arrears in 
the payments for said house, the plaintiff shall have the option of paying the 
mortgage payment directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and sending 
the difference, if any, to the defendant. If the defendant shall move more than 
50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, before the last child reaches age 18, 
ownership of the marital residence shall revert to the plaintiff, who will then 
sell the home and divide the proceeds equally with the defendant, and who 
will be responsible for all indebtedness thereon until the house is sold. These 
provisions are to ensure that the children have a suitable residence during their 
minority, are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant if she shall 
continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the form of all of the equity in 
said home, and a detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of one-
half of the equity. 
[R. at 9.] 
5. Thereafter, instead of quit-claiming his interest in the Sandy Property to Sarah 
as required by the Decree, Plaintiff Allen quit-claimed his interest in the Sandy Property to 
his mother, Norma Jean Allen, on February 15,1991. The intended purpose was to conceal 
or protect his interest in the Sandy Property. [R. at 532, 564 p. 67.] 
6. Norma Jean Allen subsequently quit-claimed the Sandy Property back to 
Plaintiff Allen. [R. at 532.] 
7. Finally, on October 18,1993, Plaintiff Allen quit-claimed the Sandy Property 
to Sarah, as had been required by the Decree to occur within 30 days of the May 17, 1990, 
Decree becoming final. [R. at 532, 564 p. 35.] 
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8. The Decree is silent about any restrictions upon, or effect of, Sarah's 
subsequent refinancing or selling the Sandy Property. There is no requirement in the Decree 
that Plaintiff Allen consent to any refinance or sale of the Sandy Property. [R. at 531.] 
9. Plaintiff Allen is employed in real estate development and is knowledgeable 
of real estate matters [R. at 532, 564 pp. 54-5] and knew the Decree permitted Sarah to sell 
or encumber the Sandy Property [R. at 532]. 
10. Sarah refinanced the Sandy Property on several occasions subsequent to the 
divorce. [R. at 533-4.] 
11. Plaintiff Allen was aware of such financings and even assisted in the financing 
of one of the loans by executing an affidavit for the title company who handled the closing. 
[R. at 534.] 
12., Plaintiff Allen never obj ected to any financing of the Sandy Property by Sarah. 
[R. at 537.] 
13. Plaintiff Allen knew of the refinancing actions of Sarah for approximately nine 
years but took no action regarding the same until bringing this action. [R. at 537.] 
14. The Sandy Property was sold by Sarah to Defendant Hall on contract on 
January 19, 1998, for the price of $146,000. [R. at 534.] To pay such price, Defendant Hall 
agreed to pay the existing first and second mortgages encumbering the Sandy Property 
(totalling approximately $139,000) and also paid Sarah $7,000. [R. at 534.] 
15. Sarah moved from the Sandy Property in January 1998 following a sale of the 
property to Defendant Hall. Sarah then continued to reside in the Salt Lake City area in 
another home. 
-5-
16. Plaintiff Allen was aware of the purchase of the Sandy Property by Defendant 
Hall at or about the time of the sale. [R. at 535.] 
17. Plaintiff Allen never objected to the sale of the Sandy Property to Defendant 
Hall. [R. at 535.] 
18. In March of 1998, Sarah filed bankruptcy. [R. at 536.] 
19. The Bankruptcy Court subsequently determined that Sarah had no equity in the 
Sandy Property and sales contract and released the Sandy Property from further Bankruptcy 
Court control. [R. at 536.] 
20. Defendant Hall subsequently refinanced the Sandy Property with Defendant 
Homecomings in the amount of $151,900, the proceeds of which repaid the two prior, 
outstanding mortgages of Sarah. The refinance was closed on June 7, 1999. [R. at 536.] 
21. Plaintiff Allen filed a Petition to Modify the Decree in June 1999. The Petition 
sought no modification of the provisions regarding the Sandy Property. [R. at 537.] 
22. Sarah moved from Utah on or about July 15, 1999, and the move was more 
than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah. [R. at 537.] 
23. An Order of Modification in the divorce matter was entered on September 12, 
1999, and did not address any issues regarding the Sandy Property. [R. at 537.] 
24. On May 18, 2000, Plaintiff Allen brought this action in the Third Judicial 
District Court seeking to enforce his claimed reversionary right to ownership of the Sandy 
Property, subject to the requirement to subsequently sell the Sandy Property and then equally 
divide the equity, if any, with Sarah. [R. at 1.] 
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25. Plaintiff Allen has not joined Sarah as a party to this action and has not herein 
claimed that she is responsible for any monies to Plaintiff Allen. [R. at 564 p. 59.] 
26. On January 12, 2002, Plaintiff Allen executed a Stipulation to Modify the 
Decree an additional time, and such Stipulation failed to address any issues regarding the 
Sandy Property, including his contingent reversionary interest therein. [R. at 537-8.] 
27. On May 20, 2003, trial in this matter was held before the lower court, the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding. [R. at 530.] 
28. Following the trial, Judge Medley issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. Judge Medley found that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy Property due to 
the facts presented at trial. A copy of such Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is 
attached as Addendum "A". 
29. On July 3, 2003, Judge Medley issued his Order and Decree Quieting Title, 
ruling that Defendant Hall owned the Sandy Property subject to the lien of Defendant 
Homecomings. Judge Medley further ruled that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy 
Property. A copy of such Order and Decree Quieting Title is attached hereto as Addendum 
"B". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Allen's claimed interest in the Sandy Property arises out of the provisions 
of the 1990 Decree, drafted entirely by Plaintiff Allen's attorney. As a result, the Decree 
should be interpreted against Plaintiff Allen in the event of a dispute over its terms. 
The Decree does not restrict Sarah from mortgaging or selling the Sandy Property. 
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Plaintiff Allen acquiesced in the post-divorce mortgaging of the Sandy Property by 
Sarah, made no claim to an interest in the Sandy Property when the it was sold by Sarah, 
failed to make any claim for his contingent reversionary interest in the Sandy Property in two 
subsequent divorce modification proceedings, and thereby waived any claim to such interest. 
There was no equity in the Sandy Property at the time the reversionary interest was allegedly 
triggered. 
The intent of the Decree should control the outcome of this matter, not a technical 
reading of the recording statutes. The Decree intended to give Plaintiff Allen one-half of any 
equity in the Sandy Property in the event Sarah moved from Salt Lake City. Unfortunately, 
there was no equity in the Sandy Property when such event occurred in 1999. 
Plaintiff Allen seeks a windfall which contravenes the purpose and intent of the 
Decree. If Plaintiff Allen were to prevail, he would theoretically receive one-half of the 
value of the Sandy Property sold by Sarah in 1999 for $146,000 inasmuch as Plaintiff Allen 
would take title to the Sandy Property without being subject to Defendant Hall's ownership 
or Defendant Homecoming's Trust Deed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Decree Of Divorce Did Not Restrict 
Post-Divorce Mortgaging Or Selling 
Of The Sandv Property 
The Decree, entered on May 17, 1990, between the parties failed to provide any 
language which restricted Sarah from refinancing the Sandy Property. The Decree 
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specifically provided that Sarah was awarded the Sandy Property "as her sole and separate 
property subject to no claim by the plaintiff. ..." Plaintiff Allen was obviously aware of 
such fact. Sarah financed or refinanced the Sandy Property several times between May 17, 
1990, and November 19, 1996. On at least one occasion, Plaintiff Allen assisted in the 
refinance process by signing an affidavit for the title company handling the transaction. 
There is no language in the Decree prohibiting Sarah from mortgaging or selling the 
Sandy Property, nor indicating what effect such actions may have on Plaintiff Allen's 
contingent reversionary interest in such property. Plaintiff Allen was experienced in real 
estate matters. In the event Plaintiff Allen intended or desired that there be some restriction 
regarding refinancing, he had the responsibility to incorporate within the Decree appropriate 
language precluding such action or otherwise providing for the effect thereof on his 
contingent reversionary interest. 
In deciding how to interpret ambiguous or unclear terms of a contract, "we look to the 
writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract provision... 
in relation to all of the others with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." 
Green River citing WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Svc. Corp., 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 
2002). "If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language and the 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. citing Cent. Fla. Invests., Inc. v. 
Parkwest Assoc, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). 
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"If the contract is found to be ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence 
of the parties' intentions." Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 925 (Utah 2002), 
citing Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
From the actions of Plaintiff Allen, it is obvious that he intended to allow Sarah the 
right to mortgage the Sandy Property following the divorce, and likewise that such financing 
would not be subordinate to his contingent reversionary right because: 
1. Plaintiff Allen was experienced in real estate matters; 
2. Plaintiff Allen's attorney drafted the Decree; 
3. The Decree does not prohibit such post-divorce financing; 
4. Plaintiff Allen was aware of such financings and even assisted Sarah in 
obtaining one of the loans; 
5. Plaintiff Allen never objected to such post-divorce financing; 
6. Plaintiff Allen entered into two post-divorce Decree modifications without 
raising any Sandy Property financing issues; and 
7. Any claim that Plaintiff Allen's contingent reversionary interest would have 
priority over subsequent mortgages would, from a practical standpoint, clearly prohibit any 
post-divorce dealings with the property by Sarah - something the Decree appears to allow. 
The Decree was prepared by Plaintiff Allen's attorney. Any ambiguity therein must 
be construed against the drafter - Plaintiff Allen. See Edwards & Daniels Architects, Inc. 
v. Farmers' Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah courts 
"interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation 'To 
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable' (citation 
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omitted).. . . [W]hether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Taylor v. Hansen, 
958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1998), citing Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 
(Utah App. 1990). See also Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1995); Inter-west Const v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996). 
Consequently, Defendant Homecomings should not suffer damages as a result of 
Plaintiff Allen's omission in the Decree. Defendant Homecomings paid off the first and 
second mortgages against the Sandy Property incurred by Sarah. Defendant Homecomings' 
Trust Deed should remain a valid lien against the Sandy Property and should be superior to 
any claim of Plaintiff Allen. 
IL 
The Lower Court Properly Enforced The 
Intent Of The Decree Of Divorce Over 
A Technical Application Of The Recording Statute 
Plaintiff Allen relies solely upon the constructive notice provisions of Utah's 
recording statutes in his argument that his contingent reversionary interest in the Sandy 
Property should have priority over any other interest in such property. To do so ignores the 
purpose and intent of the Decree and would give Plaintiff Allen a windfall. 
Plaintiff Allen claims that he takes title with no liens to Defendant Homecomings and 
no interest to Defendant Hall. In other words, he seeks ownership of a home sold in 1999 
for $146,000 free and clear (subject to the obligation to sell and give one-half of the equity 
to Sarah). This would frustrate the purpose of the Decree, circumvent the intent of the 
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divorce court's ruling, and give Plaintiff Allen a windfall. He would be unjustly enriched. 
Plaintiff Allen's claims must be viewed with the intent and purpose of the Decree in mind. 
As stated in the Decree, one of the purposes of the Sandy Property arrangement was 
clearly "to ensure that the children [of the parties] have a suitable residence during their 
minority." To effectuate such result, Sarah clearly needed the right to deal independently 
with the Sandy Property, including the right to mortgage the same. Sarah was responsible 
to make the mortgage payments on the Sandy Property. 
In the event the Sandy Property was returned to Plaintiff Allen, the Decree 
specifically provides that Plaintiff Allen would be responsible for the indebtedness owed on 
such property at such time. Defendant Homecomings took a Trust Deed on the Sandy 
Property on June 26,1999. Sarah moved from Utah on or about July 15,1999. If the Sandy 
Property is determined to have reverted to Plaintiff Allen on July 15, 1999, Plaintiff Allen 
accordingly became responsible for the indebtedness owed on the Sandy Property and, more 
specifically, the indebtedness owed to Defendant Homecomings. 
Otherwise, Plaintiff Allen would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Defendant 
Homecomings. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 
12 P.3d 580 (Utah 2000), has provided that a claim for unjust enrichment must meet three 
elements: 
"(1) there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) the 
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit; and (3) there must 
be the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value." 
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Defendant Homecomings paid off the first and second mortgages which were incurred 
by Sarah. Plaintiff Allen clearly had knowledge of Defendant Homecomings' payment of 
such indebtedness and will clearly appreciate its benefit if Plaintiff Allen took the Sandy 
Property free and clear from any claim by Defendant Homecomings. It would clearly be 
inequitable to allow Plaintiff Allen to claim the Sandy Property free and clear of any claim 
by Defendant Homecomings. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff Allen should be estopped from making such a claim due to his 
drafting of the terms of the Decree, his awareness and even assistance in Sarah's post-divorce 
mortgaging of the Sandy Properly and his failure to address the contingent reversionary 
interest in the two post-divorce modification matters. 
In the case ofState, Dept. of Human Services, ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 
680 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
"The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel are: (1) an 
admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement or act, 
and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act." 
Plaintiff Allen had numerous opportunities to (1) object to Sarah's post-divorce 
mortgaging of the Sandy Property or (2) inform mortgage companies and Defendant Hall of 
the provision within the Decree giving Plaintiff Allen a contingent reversionary interest in 
the Sandy Property. Failure to do so in the circumstances of this case should estop Plaintiff 
Allen from now claiming that others interests are void. The elements of estoppel having 
been established within the present case, the interest of Defendant Homecomings is superior 
to that of Plaintiff Allen under the doctrine of estoppel. 
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Finally, Plaintiff Allen's claims should be barred by the doctrine of laches. The Utah 
Supreme Court in DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 845 (Utah 1995), has 
stated, "[a] defendant may successfully assert this defense [laches] when a plaintiff seeking 
equity unreasonably delays in bringing an action and this delay prejudices the defendant" 
(citation omitted). 
Plaintiff Allen became aware of his former spouse incurring debt on the Sandy 
Property as early as November 1996. Plaintiff Allen would have had the opportunity from 
November 1996 until June 1999 to address the issue of the incurred indebtedness with his 
former spouse. Plaintiff Allen further became aware of the sale of the Sandy Property in 
January 1998 but failed to take any action until May 2000. During the period between 
January 1998 and May 2000, Defendant Homecomings paid off Sarah's first and second 
mortgages on the Sandy Property. If Plaintiff Allen had commenced an action against Sarah 
in November 1996 due to the increased indebtedness being taken against the Sandy Property, 
and further if Plaintiff Allen had commenced an action against Defendant Hall shortly after 
January 1998, Defendant Homecomings would not have paid off Sarah's first and second 
mortgages on the Sandy Property and would not be involved in the present litigation. 
Defendant Homecomings will be prejudiced if Plaintiff Allen is allowed to obtain the Sandy 
Property free and clear from any claim by Defendant Homecomings. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff Allen has had approximately seven years within which to 
address the issues on the Sandy Property with his former spouse. In addition, during that 
same period of time, Plaintiff Allen filed two petitions to modify Decree, during which 
Plaintiff Allen could have addressed the indebtedness incurred against the Sandy Property 
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by Plaintiff Allen's former spouse. The indebtedness incurred against the Sandy Property 
is a result of the actions of Sarah and Plaintiff Allen's failure to include appropriate language 
within the Decree prohibiting Sarah from incurring additional indebtedness against the Sandy 
Property. Accordingly, Plaintiff Allen should have addressed the issue within the divorce 
action and sought damages against his former spouse for the additional debt taken against the 
Sandy Property, if Plaintiff Allen felt entitlement to additional rights under the Decree. 
Defendant Homecomings has done nothing more than to pay off the indebtedness incurred 
by Plaintiff Allen's former spouse. If the Sandy Property had been returned to Plaintiff Allen 
prior to Defendant Homecomings paying off the prior first and second mortgages, Plaintiff 
Allen would have received the Sandy Property, subject to the first and second mortgages in 
the sum of approximately $139,000 incurred by Sarah. Therefore, if Plaintiff Allen believed 
his former spouse had inappropriately incurred debt against the Sandy Property, then he 
should have sought damages under the divorce action. 
III. 
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act Issue Is Moot 
Plaintiff Allen seeks to have this Court set aside the lower court's finding that the 
Utah Occupying Claimants Act would apply, even if Plaintiff Allen's reversionary interest 
were upheld to void the interest of Defendants Homecomings and Hall. The lower court 
specifically found such ruling to be moot in light of the ruling quieting title in the name of 
Defendant Hall. Although Defendant Homecomings is not directly affected by such 
observation by the lower court, it agrees with the same. However, inasmuch as the lower 
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court found that portion of the lower court's ruling to be moot in light of the circumstances, 
Defendant Homecomings does not address such issue in this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Decree of Divorce did not prohibit Sarah from mortgaging or selling the Sandy 
Property, nor give Plaintiff Allen priority over such transactions in the event his contingent 
equity interest was ever triggered. The Decree of Divorce should be construed against 
Plaintiff Allen, drafter of the same. 
Plaintiff Allen seeks a windfall in contravention to the intent and purpose of the 1990 
Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff Allen relies upon a technical reading of the recording statute 
to elevate his claimed interest in the Sandy Property over the interests of Defendants Hall 
and Homecomings. 
The lower court properly enforced the intent and purpose of the Decree of Divorce 
which was structured to give Plaintiff Allen a contingent interest in equity, if any existed, in 
the Sandy Property in the event Sarah should move from Salt Lake City, Utah. No equity 
existed in the Sandy Property when such event occurred. 
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act was determined to be moot by the trial court in 
light of its ruling and is not relevant to this appeal. Furthermore, such issue does not affect 
Defendant Homecomings. 
The lower court ruling was proper and should be upheld by this Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January, 2004. 
NELSON. 
By: 
[STENSEN & HELSTEN 
X 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Homecomings 
Financial Network, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on 20th day of January, 2004, I caused to be hand 
delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee Homecomings 
Financial Network, Inc. to the following: 
James G. Swensen, Jr., Esq. 
Swensen & Andersen PLLC 
136 South Main Street, Suite 318 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
with two (2) true and correct copies to be mailed, addressed as follows: 
Thomas K. Hall 
448 East Golden P h e a s ^ 
Draper, UT 84020 / \ 
/ /U-_ J. / jfo^ 
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Addendum A 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. ALLEN, an individual, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : CASE NO. 000904054 
THOMAS K. HALL, an individual, : 
and HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL 
NETWORK, INC., a Delaware : 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for 
trial on the 20th day of May, 2003, before the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley; plaintiff appearing in person and by his attorney, James G. 
Swensen, Jr.; defendant, Thomas K. Hall, appearing in person and by 
his attorney, Kay M. Lewis; and defendant, Homecomings Financial 
Network, Inc., appearing through its attorney, Matthew N. Olsen; 
plaintiff and defendants having presented evidence and testimony to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff, David J. Allen, and Sarah Satterfield 
Allen were divorced on May 17, 1990, pursuant to a Decree of 
Divorce entered in this Court. 
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2. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce entered on May 17, 
1990, Sarah Satterfield Allen, the former spouse of plaintiff, was 
awarded the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, 
Utah, "as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by the 
plaintiff." The Decree further provided: 
The defendant shall be responsible for all indebtedness 
and expenses therefrom, holding the plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. The plaintiff shall provide the defendant 
with a Quit-Claim Deed within 30 days of the divorce 
becoming final, with said Quit-Claim Deed to contain the 
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant 
maintaining current house payments and not moving from 
the Salt Lake City area before the last child reaches age 
18. If the defendant shall become more than 60 days in 
arrears in the payments for said house, the plaintiff 
shall have the option of paying the mortgage payment 
directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and 
sending the difference, if any, to the defendant. If the 
defendant shall move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake 
City, Utah, before the last child reaches age 18, 
ownership of the marital residence shall revert to the 
plaintiff, who will then sell the home and divide the 
proceeds equally with the defendant, and who will be 
responsible for all indebtedness thereon until the house 
is sold. These provisions are to ensure that the 
children have a suitable residence during their minority, 
are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant if 
she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 
the form of all of the equity in said home, and a 
detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of 
one-half of the equity. 
3. That the Decree of Divorce did not restrict Sarah 
Satterfield Allen from refinancing or selling the property. Under 
the Decree David Allen's consent is not necessary in order for 
Sarah Allen to mortgage, refinance or sell the home. That David 
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Allen's attorney prepared the Decree and David Allen, employed in 
real estate development, is knowledgeable of real estate matters 
and knew the Decree permitted Sarah Allen to sell or encumber the 
property, yet failed to take proper steps to correct this problem 
or alternatively accepted the consequences resulting therefrom. 
Plaintiff David Allen in fact testified that on numerous occasions 
Sarah Allen threatened to sell the home because she was entitled to 
do so under the Decree. 
4. That on about February 15, 1991, plaintiff, David J. 
Allen, quit-claimed the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, 
Sandy, Utah, to his mother, Norma Jean Allen, instead of quit-
claiming the property to Sarah Allen as required by the Decree. 
Plaintiff's transfer of the property to his mother was intended to 
conceal or protect his interest in that he testified that he could 
have taken the property out of his mother's name at any time. 
5. That on or about October 25, 1993, Norma Jean Allen quit-
claimed the property back to the plaintiff, David J. Allen. 
6. That plaintiff quit-claimed the property located at 10159 
S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, to his former spouse, Sarah 
Satterfield Allen, on October 28, 1993. 
7. That Sarah Satterfield Allen recorded the Quit-Claim Deed 
to the property on May 11, 1994. 
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8. That on or about June 24, 1994, Sarah Satterfield Allen 
refinanced the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, 
Utah, with CFC Mortgage Corporation, a California corporation, for 
the sum of $75,227. 
9. That on or about July 14, 1994, Sarah Satterfield Allen 
again refinanced the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, 
Sandy, Utah with CFC Mortgage Corporation, a California 
corporation, for the sum of $75,196. 
10. That on or about February 25, 1995, Sarah Satterfield 
Allen took a second mortgage against the property located at 10159 
S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with Pacific Rim Financial Services 
for the sum of $7,000. 
11. That on or about July 28, 1995, Sarah Satterfield Allen 
refinanced the second mortgage on the property located at 10159 S. 
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with United Companies Lending 
Corporation for the sum of $29,300. 
12. That on or about October 31, 1995, Sarah Satterfield 
Allen refinanced the first and second mortgages on the property 
located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with UMG Funding 
Group, Inc., for the sum of $109,600. 
13. That on or about April 11, 1996, Sarah Satterfield Allen 
again refinanced the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, 
Sandy, Utah, with CTX Mortgage company for the sum of $120,000. 
ALLEN V. HALL PAGE 5 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
14. That on or about November 19, 1996, Sarah Satterfield 
Allen took a second mortgage on the property located at 10159 S. 
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with the Equi-Credit Corporation for 
the sum of $21,400. 
15. That on or about November, 18, 1996, the plaintiff had 
knowledge of Sarah Satterfield Allen taking a second mortgage on 
the property and assisted Sarah Satterfield Allen by executing an 
Affidavit for Academy Title Company. 
16. That on or about January 19, 1998, defendant Thomas K. 
Hall purchased the subject property from Sarah Allen pursuant to a 
residential purchase agreement executed between them. That on or 
about January 19, 1998, Sarah Allen quit-claimed the real property 
located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, to the defendant, 
Thomas K. Hall. 
17. The agreement shows a sales price of $146,000. Hall paid 
this price in the form of $7,000 cash directly to Sarah Allen and 
assumption of the outstanding first and second mortgages with 
balances of a total of approximately $13 9,000. The mortgage 
payments were to be made by Hall directly to Sarah Allen who was to 
forward them on to the appropriate mortgage company. 
18. At the time defendant Hall purchased the home, he 
inquired of Sarah Allen whether there were outstanding liens or 
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other encumbrances against the property and was told that there 
were none. 
19. Within two days after purchasing the subject property and 
taking possession, defendant Hall returned home to find plaintiff 
David Allen in the house. When he inquired why David Allen had 
forcibly entered the home, plaintiff David Allen told Hall that he 
had learned the house had been sold and that he was merely picking 
up some property that allegedly belonged to himself and his 
children. David Allen then left Hall's house, making no comment or 
giving any other indication to Hall that he, David Allen, still had 
or claimed to have an interest in the house or that he had any 
objection to the fact that Sarah Allen had sold the home. 
20. Defendant, Thomas K. Hall, reasonably believing that he 
was the owner of the home because of the purchase agreement and the 
deed he had received from Sarah Allen, defendant Hall then 
initiated and completed considerable work to clean up, improve and 
remodel the home. Defendant Hall expended $42,279 to improve the 
home, an additional $10,000 for labor, plus real property taxes for 
years 1998 through 2002 in the sum of $6,974.67. 
21. As he agreed to do when he purchased the home, Hall made 
the first and second mortgage payments directly to defendant Sarah 
Allen for several months. However, he then discovered that she was 
ALLEN V. HALL PAGE 7 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
not forwarding these payments on as agreed and that the house was 
in danger of foreclosure. 
22. In March of 1998, Sarah Allen filed bankruptcy which 
forestalled the foreclosure of the home. 
23. Defendant Hall then sought and obtained financing from 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., to pay off the existing 
mortgages in order to forestall the foreclosure, and obtained the 
appropriate relief and consent to do so from both Sarah Allen and 
the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
24. In her bankruptcy petition, Sarah Allen stated that the 
value of the home was $147,000; based on this valuation, the 
property was released from the bankruptcy as having no equity for 
the benefit of Sarah Allen's creditors. 
25. With the proceeds of the loan from Homecomings, defendant 
Hall paid approximately $124,631.32 to Fleet Mortgage for the first 
mortgage, and approximately $22,33 6.69 to Equi-credit for the 
second mortgage for a total of $145,784. That Homecomings 
Financial Network, Inc., secured the loan with a Trust Deed that 
was recorded on the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, 
Sandy, Utah, on June 26, 1999. 
26. When added to the $7,000 defendant Hall paid to Sarah 
Allen for her equity at the time of the initial transaction, 
defendant Hall has paid $6,784 in excess of the purchase price due 
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to Sarah Allen's failure to forward the mortgage payments to the 
lenders as agreed thus incurring significant late fees and interest 
charges. 
27. Defendant Hall continued to reside in the home until a 
few months ago when, because of this litigation, he rented it out 
to third parties. 
28. Plaintiff David Allen knew of the refinancing by Sarah 
Allen for approximately nine years yet did nothing until bringing 
this lawsuit against defendant Hall. Plaintiff David Allen, after 
learning of the sale of the home to defendant Hall, again waited 
for over two years before filing this lawsuit. 
29. That plaintiff David Allen filed a Petition to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1999, and failed to address any 
issues regarding the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, 
Sandy, Utah. 
30. That Sarah Satterfield Allen left the state of Utah on or 
about July 15, 1999. 
31. That an Order of Modification was entered on September 
23, 1999, and again failed to address any issues regarding the 
property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah. 
32. That the plaintiff executed a Stipulation to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce on January 12, 2002, and that on January 12, 
SVI 
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2002, Sarah Satterfield Allen executed a Quit-Claim Deed in favor 
of plaintiff as to the subject property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sarah Allen and plaintiff David Allen were divorced on 
May 17, 1990. That the Decree of Divorce awarded Sarah Allen the 
subject property as her sole and separate property subject to no 
claim from David Allen, except as set forth in paragraph 10 of the 
Decree. 
2. That the Decree is interpreted according to the 
established rules of contract interpretation. That the Decree is 
ambiguous in that the indebtedness referenced in paragraph 10 can 
be interpreted to mean the amount of indebtedness at the time of 
entry of the Decree as asserted by plaintiff or the amount of 
indebtedness at the time of the effective date of plaintiff's 
reversionary interest. The Court concludes that pursuant to the 
Decree plaintiff is responsible for all indebtedness on the subject 
property in the event the property was returned to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff, with the assistance of counsel, drafted and negotiated 
the Decree, therefore the Decree is construed against plaintiff. 
That defendant, Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., maintains a 
Trust Deed against the real property in the principal amount of 
$148,291.33, which Trust Deed is superior to any claim of the 
plaintiff. The Court cannot find that it was the intention of the 
5 1 * 
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Aliens to enter a Decree that can be interpreted to produce an 
extraordinary inequitable result by returning the property to 
plaintiff free and clear of all debt allegations despite the 
constructive notice resulting from plaintiff's recorded 
reversionary interest. 
3. The Decree negotiated and drafted by plaintiff in 1990 
did not preclude Sarah Allen from mortgaging, refinancing, selling 
or liquidating her equity in the subject property. Sarah Allen 
refinanced and mortgaged the subject property several times with 
plaintiff's knowledge and at least on one occasion with his active 
consent and participation therein. The Decree was entered on May 
1990 and for at least ten years plaintiff failed to protect and 
clarify his interest in the property, 
4. Plaintiff Allen drafted and negotiated a Decree which, 
with his years of experience in real estate development, had to 
have known was unclear, ambiguous and potentially harmful to 
innocent third parties who may purchase the property or take the 
property as security for loans. Plaintiff had full knowledge of 
Sarah Allen's encumbering and refinancing of the property even 
though the encumbrances under the Decree would reduce his 
beneficial reversionary interest. Plaintiff's failure to protect 
this interest for ten years by not clarifying the Decree and his 
conduct of participating in allowing Sarah Allen to refinance and 
S3«\ 
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sell the property to defendant Hall is inconsistent with his 
current claim that he is entitled to the property free and clear of 
all claims and indebtedness. 
5. In January 1998, with plaintiff Allen's full knowledge 
and apparent consent, Sarah Allen sold the subject property to 
defendant Hall at its fair market value for approximately $146,000. 
Defendant Hall purchased the property in good faith without actual 
knowledge of plaintiff Allen's claimed interest except for the 
constructive notice provided by David Allen's recorded interest. 
Plaintiff Allen had full knowledge of the sale of the subject 
property to defendant Hall yet remained silent as to his 
reversionary interest even though plaintiff Allen had sufficient 
reason to believe defendant Hall was unaware of the beneficial 
reversionary interest. Plaintiff had to have known based upon his 
years in real estate development that defendant Hall would 
establish or assume mortgage obligations, property tax obligations 
and make substantial improvements to the property as set forth 
hereinbefore, yet plaintiff Allen remained silent and waited 
approximately two years after notice of the sale before initiating 
this lawsuit and never taking any action in the divorce case to 
clarify his interest, all to the detriment of defendants 
Homecomings Financial and Hall and to the benefit of plaintiff. 
The Court finds plaintiff's Allen's silence, delay and inactivity 
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to be intentional and designed to enhance the value and equity of 
the subject property to the detriment of defendants Homecomings 
Financial and Hall. To quiet title in plaintiff Allen under these 
circumstances free and clear from all claims and indebtedness 
asserted by defendants Homecoming Financial and Hall would be 
unjust, inequitable and intolerable. 
6. Title to the subject property is quieted in defendant 
Hall, subject to the financial claims of defendant Homecomings 
Financial, free and clear from any claim or interest of plaintiff 
Allen, whose claim is hereby disallowed based upon laches, estoppel 
and unjust enrichment. 
7. The Court further finds that on or about July 15, 1999, 
when Sarah Allen moved from the state of Utah, plaintiff Allen's 
reversionary interest which was designed to return ownership to 
plaintiff Allen for the sole purpose of selling and dividing equity 
as set forth in paragraph 10 of the Decree is extinguished based 
upon release of the property from Sarah Allen's bankruptcy upon the 
grounds that the property was heavily encumbered with zero equity. 
Therefore, any reversionary interests solely for the purpose of 
dividing equity is nullified. 
8. Plaintiff's condition subsequent reversionary interest 
which results in a forfeiture are not favored in the law and are 
strictly construed. Paragraph 10 of the Decree is ambiguous and 
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unclear and not clearly expressed making performance impossible 
without substantial inequitable harm to innocent third parties 
therefore the interest is extinguished. Minneapolis Machine Co. v. 
Hanson, 101 Minn. 260; 112 N.W. 217 (1907). 
9. But for having quieted title to the property in defendant 
Thomas K. Hall's name subject to Homecomings Financial Network, 
Inc. ' s financial interests, and free and clear from any interest of 
plaintiff, David Allen, defendant Hall pursuant to Section 57-6-1, 
Utah Occupying Claimants Act, would be entitled to be reimbursed 
from plaintiff, David Allen, for improvements in the sum of 
$42,279.36, plus labor in the sum of $10,000, plus the real 
property taxes between 1998 and 2002 in the sum of $6,974.67. This 
alternative claim is now moot. 
10. Defendant Thomas K. Hall's claim to damages for excess 
interest payments is denied. 
11. Counsel for defendants Hall and Homecomings Financial are 
instructed to submit an Order and Judgment consistent with this 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Dated this ^ day of June, 2^003. ]f; 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this / ^ day of June, 2003: 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main, Suite 318 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kay M. Lewis 
Attorney for Defendant Hall 
320 South 300 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Matthew N. 01sen 
Attorneys for Defendant Homecomings Financial 
8142 S. State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Addendum B 
Order and Decree Quieting Title 
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Kay M. Lewis (Bar No. 1944) 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Third Party Plaintiff 
Thomas K. Hall 
320 South 300 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4981 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. ALLEN, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS K. HALL, an individual, and 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
THOMAS K. HALL, an individual, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SARAH SATTERFIELD ALLEN, 
Third Party Defendant. 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
ir7 h> ^  /* ? 
i ENTS 
ORDER AND DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE 
Civil No. 00-090*4054 
JUDGE MEDLEY 
JD 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Tyron 
E. Medley on May 20, 2003. Plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorney, James G. Swensen, 
Jr. Defendant Thomas K. Hall appeared in person and by his attorney, Kay M. Lewis. Defendant 
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., appeared through its attorney, Matthew N. Olsen. Third 
Party Defendant Sarah Satterfield Allen did not appear either in person or by counsel. 
The court having reviewed the evidence and heard the testimony presented by the 
parties, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters 
its: 
ORDER AND DECREE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce entered between the Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant is ambiguous and, therefore, is construed against the Plaintiff, any claim to 
ownership by the Plaintiff Allen arising from the Decree is extinguished, and any reversionary 
interest solely for the purpose of dividing equity is nullified. 
2. The claims of Plaintiff Allen to quiet title and for unjust enrichment to the 
hereinafter described real property are denied. 
3. Title to the following described real property situate in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
is hereby quieted in favor of Thomas K. Hall, subject to the financial claims of Defendant 
Homecomings Financial, and free and clear of any claims of the Plaintiff, whose claim is hereby 
disallowed based upon laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment. 
4. The claims of Defendant Hall under the Utah Occupying Claimants' Act (§57-6-
1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) for improvement, labor and real property taxes are 
moot as title to the property is quieted in Defendant Hall. 
5. The claim of Defendant Hall for damages for excess interest is denied. 
- 2 -
6. The real property which is the subject of this order is more particularly 
described as follows: 
28-09-381-012 
Lot 3, WHITE CITY NO. 41, according to the official plat thereof, as 
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
DATED this day of N ^ f U ^ ^ y ^ , 2003. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, this 
20th day of June, 2003, to: 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 South Main Street, Suite 318 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Matthew Olsen 
Attorney for Defendants Homecomings 
Financial Network, Inc. 
8142 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Sarah Satterfield Allen, pro se 
1300 Shepherd Street 
Durham, North Carolina 27707 
iTiULkdUx) M « 
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Addendum C 
Decree of Divorce 
Th i - ' Judicial D^U'-t 
n% 171990 
^Jmduid^^— 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; ~ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH , - . .. \ 
DAVID JOHN ALLEN, ) 
plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
SARAH SATTERFIELD ALLEN, ) Civil No. 89490 3635 
defendant. ) Judge John A. Rokich 
This matter came on for hearing the 17th day of May, 1990. 
The plaintiff v/as present with his attorney, Jane Allen. The 
defendant was not present, having executed and filed with the court 
an appearance, consent, and waiver in which she agreed that her** 
default may be entered. Based upon the testimony of the plaintiff, 
the file herein, good cause appearing therefor, and the court 
having made and entered the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce, the same to 
become final upon entry. 
2. The plaintiff has been a resident of Salt Lake County for 
the three months immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint 
for Divorce. 
3. The parties were married on May 31, 1988 in Chatanooga, 
Jane Allen, Bar #45 
Attorney for plaintiff 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-1300 
Tennesee, and are now and have been since that time husband and 
wife. 
4. The parties suffer from irreconcilable differences. 
5. There have been four children born of this marriage, to 
wit: Ashley Angier, born January 24, 1981; Samuel David Allen, 
born August 13, 1982; Peter Kale Allen, born October 12, 1982; and 
William John, born August 25, 1985. 
6* The defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded 
the care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties 
subject to the plaintiff's reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation, upon reasonable notice to the defendant. 
7. The plaintiff shall pay child support to the defendant in 
the amount of $200.00 per child, $800.00 total for the four 
children until said child reaches age 18 or graduates from high 
school with his or her class, whichever comes last. 
8. The defendant shall be entitled to mandatory income 
withholding relief should the plaintiff become more than 30 days 
in arrears in his child support obligation. 
9. The plaintiff shall keep in force any policy of health 
and accident insurance available through his employment or pay the 
cost to provide insurance through the defendant's employment, for 
the benefit of the minor children of the parties, with the 
plaintiff to pay any non-routine medical, dental,^ optical, or 
orthodontic expenses incurred by the minor children of the partie.s 
which is not covered by insurance. The plaintiff shall bear the 
cost of said insurance, which presently is $60.00 per month. 
10. The plaintiff is purchasing the house and lot located at 
10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah which shall be awarded to the 
defendant as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by 
the plaintiff except as set forth in this paragraph. The defendant 
shall be reponsible for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom, 
holding the plaintiff harmless therefrom- The plaintiff shall 
provide the defendant with a quit-claim deed within 3 0 days of the 
divorce becoming final, with said quit-claim deed to contain the 
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant maintaining 
durrent house payments and not moving from the Salt Lake City area 
before the last child reaches age 18. If the defendant shall 
become more than 60 days in arrears in the payments for said house, 
the plaintiff shall have the option of paying the mortgage payment 
directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and sending the 
difference, if any, to the defendant. If the defendant shall move 
more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City Utah before the last child 
reaches age 18, ownership of the marital residence shall revert to 
the plaintiff, who will then sell the home and divide the proceeds 
equally with the defendant, and who will be responsible for all 
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold. These provisions are 
to ensure that the children have a suitable residence during their 
minority, and are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant 
if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah in the form 
of all of the equity in said home, and a detriment^if she shall 
move, in the form of the loss of one-half of the equity. 
11. The personal property of the parties has been divided 
equitably between them and each party shall retain the property 
presently in his or her posession, with the party retaining an item 
to be responsible for all indebtedness thereon. 
12. The plaintiff shall pay alimony to the defendant at the 
rate of $800.00 per month beginning May 1, 1990 and continuing 
until April 31, 1991, at which time it shall decrease to $400.00 
per month. If the defendant shall earn more than $12,000 per year 
in the first year following the divorce, the alimony shall 
immediately decrease to $400.00 per month. Said alimony shall 
terminate upon the death of either party or by operation of law. 
Child support and alimony payments are due in two equal payments 
on the 1st and 15th of each month. 
13. The plaintiff shall retain the automobile presently in 
his possession and the defendant shall retain the Volkswagen with 
the plaintiff to be responsible for all indebtedness and 
maintenance expenses, holding the defendant harmless therefrom, 
for his automobile, and also the Volkswagen and he shall make all 
car payments and maintain insurance coverage until such time as the 
automobile is sold by the defendant or paid for in full, at which 
time the plaintiff shall deliver title to said automobile to the 
defendant and this obligation shall cease. This obligation shall 
terminate on the death of the defendant, or when paid in full 
whichever comes first, and shall be considered alimony for tax 
purposes. 
14. The plaintiff shall pay the debt for the Volkswagen. The 
defendant shall pay all student loans in her name alone. Each party 
shall be solely responsible for all debts incurred in his or her 
own name after December, 1988, holding the other party harmless 
therefrom. The plaintiff knows of no unpaid marital debts. 
15. The plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance policy on 
his life in the amount of $250,000, the proceeds of which shall be 
payable into a trust of which all of the parties1 children are the 
beneficiaries, which shall be maintained until the youngest child 
reaches age 22 or graduates from college with his class, whichever 
occurs later. 
16. The defendant shall claim all of the children as 
dependents for income tax purposes* 
17. The plaintiff shall provide for the childrens1 college 
educations if he is financially able in an amount not more than his 
child support obligation,, on the condition that they maintain at 
least a "B" average and attend school full time. Said support shall 
end at age 22 or upon graduation from college with an undergraduate 
degree, whichever comes first. 
18. The plaintiff has paid all attorneys's fees and costs 
incurred in this action to date. 
DATED this /J day of ^ ^ y ^ , 1990. tr 
BY THE COURT: 
A 
Judge John A. Rokici 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
^certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing decree of divorce to Sarah Satterfield Allen, 10159 
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84070, postage prepaid this (7 day of 
May, 1990. 
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